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ABSTRACT
U.S. public anger and desires to avenge the 11 September 2001 terror attacks were redirected
toward Iraq partly because of its identity as an Arab and Muslim state. Online panel survey data
reveal that citizens who were relatively angry about the terror attacks were more belligerent
toward Iraq, and that this effect was strongest among those who perceived Arabs and Muslims in
monolithic terms. Angry desires to avenge 9/11 were more persistent for those who saw Arabs
and Muslims in that light, and their effects on war support were partially mediated by worsened
feelings about Arabs and Muslims in general. These findings help explain why public
belligerence toward Iraq shot up right after 9/11, before President George W. Bush began
alleging that Iraq was pursuing weapons of mass destruction and had ties to al Qaeda.

1

Anger and desires to avenge the 11 September 2001 terror attacks on New York and
Washington apparently heightened U.S. public support for war against Iraq, but it remains
unclear why. War support surged right after 9/11, in the absence of any evidence linking Iraq to
the 9/11 attacks or al Qaeda, months before President George W. Bush accused that country of
being part of an “Axis of Evil,” and almost a year before he began vigorously campaigning for
war.1 Relatively angry and punitive citizens also tended to be more hawkish on Iraq, and many
said that war would help satisfy a desire to avenge 9/11.2 Americans who mistakenly believed
that Iraq had been involved in the attacks would have favored retaliation to neutralize the Iraqi
threat, to promote general deterrence, or to obtain justice.3 But mistaken revenge does not tell
the whole story. Many citizens who said Iraq had not been involved in 9/11 nonetheless also
acknowledged feeling that war would satisfy their desires for revenge.4
We argue here that many Americans wanted to lash out at Iraq because they saw it as part
of an “Arab–Muslim world” to which the actual terrorist culprits also belonged. Similar effects
have been observed in conflicts among rival gangs, clans, ethnic groups, and belligerents in
ideological civil wars, in which members of an externally injured group support “vicarious
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Peter Liberman and Linda J. Skitka, "Revenge in US Public Support for War against Iraq," Public Opinion
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War over Iraq: Selling War to the American Public," Security Studies 14, no. 1 (2005): 106–139.
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retribution” against uninvolved members of the perpetrator’s group.5 The same underlying
psychological mechanisms are likely to enflame antagonisms across international borders as well
as within them. Yet, although there are large literatures on intergroup perceptions, emotions, and
aggression, research remains quite limited on vicarious retribution, particularly in the
international context. We thus explain when and how the vicarious retribution model should be
extended to foreign policy opinion, and test several hypotheses using survey data from 2001–
2002 on U.S. public reactions to 9/11 and support for war against Iraq. Our analysis extends the
literature on public support for war against Iraq, which up until now has included some studies
on the role of anger and punitiveness and others on the role of prejudice, but none focusing on
their interaction.6
Vicarious retribution merits attention from international security scholars and
policymakers because public opinion affects democracies’ ability to wage war. Although leaders
can manipulate or ignore public opinion to a degree, they generally need to mobilize popular
support to bring a democracy to war.7 Understanding the psychological mechanisms affecting

5
Social psychology research on vicarious retribution includes Brian Lickel, Norman Miller, Douglas M.
Stenstrom, Thomas F. Denson, and Toni Schmader, "Vicarious Retribution: The Role of Collective Blame in
Intergroup Aggression," Personality and Social Psychology Review 10, no. 4 (2006): 372–390; Douglas M.
Stenstrom, Brian Lickel, Thomas F. Denson, and Norman Miller, "The Roles of Ingroup Identification and Outgroup
Entitativity in Intergroup Retribution," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 34, no. 11 (2008): 1570–1582;
Eduardo A. Vasquez, Lisa Wenborne, Madeline Peers, Emma Alleyne, and Kirsty Ellis, "Any of Them Will Do: In‐
Group Identification, Out‐Group Entitativity, and Gang Membership as Predictors of Group‐Based Retribution,"
Aggressive Behavior 41, no. 3 (January 2015): 242–252. For studies of similar effects in civil wars, though termed
“generalized retribution,” “ethnic hatred,” or “blood revenge,” see Roger D. Petersen, Understanding Ethnic
Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth Century Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002); Anne Speckhard and Khapta Ahkmedova, "The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism,"
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 5 (2006): 429–492; Emil Aslan Souleimanov and Huseyn Aliyev, "Blood
Revenge and Violent Mobilization: Evidence from the Chechen Wars," International Security 40, no. 2 (Fall 2015):
158–180; Laia Balcells, Rivalry and Revenge: The Politics of Violence During Civil War (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2017).
6
The former are cited in fn. 2 above; the latter include Donald R. Kinder and Cindy D. Kam, Us Against Them:
Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); John Sides and
Kimberly Gross, "Stereotypes of Muslims and Support for the War on Terror," Journal of Politics 75, no. 3 (2013):
583–598.
7
Matthew A. Baum and Philip B. K. Potter, War and Democratic Constraint: How the Public Influences
Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).
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popular bellicosity thus illuminates the political constraints on democratic war-making. If
vicarious retribution following 9/11 affected U.S. public support for war against Iraq, then a
future terrorist attack or national injury also might create opportunities for leaders to pursue
strategically unrelated war agendas. Vicarious retribution also could affect war decisions more
directly, if—as a growing literature contends—retribution and anger sometimes influence
leaders’ own thinking.8 Even if such effects are rare, they potentially could cause costly wars,
counter-retaliation, and further cycles of violence.
The next section discusses the causes of vicarious retribution and its consequences for
foreign policy opinion, explains why vicarious retribution was likely to have affected post-9/11
U.S. opinion, and reviews previously available evidence on this hypothesis. The following
section provides new evidence for the vicarious retribution account, and the article concludes by
discussing implications for the roles of emotion, values, and identity in foreign policy opinion
and international conflict.

Vicarious retribution and support for war
Whereas ordinary retribution punishes those who committed a crime, vicarious
retribution targets a particular class of non-perpetrators—those who share a common identity or
group membership with the actual culprits.9 Vicarious retribution research builds on extensive
social psychology findings that people who identify strongly with a group react with outrage and
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Oded Löwenheim and Gadi Heimann, "Revenge in International Politics," Security Studies 17, no. 4 (2008):
685–724; Richard Ned Lebow, Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010); Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A. Hunzeker, "Rage of Honor: Entente Indignation and
the Lost Chance for Peace in the First World War," Security Studies 24, no. 4 (October-December 2015): 662–695;
Todd H. Hall, "On Provocation: Outrage, International Relations, and the Franco–Prussian War," Security Studies
26, no. 1 (2017): 1–29.
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desires for revenge following a serious crime against fellow group members.10 Rather than
examining the causes of intergroup anger, however, this research has focused on how perceived
group categorization affects aggressiveness toward uninvolved targets. Although this literature
has addressed neither the rationality of vicarious retribution nor its international manifestations,
there are good reasons to expect that under certain conditions it can generate non-prudential
public support for military force.

Psychological mechanisms
One of the main findings of prior vicarious retribution research is that animosity and
punishment toward the offenders’ entire group is heightened by perceptions of that group as
homogenous, cohesive, or both. Because an outgroup’s perceived homogeneity and
cohesiveness have been found to have convergent consequences for intergroup emotions and
attitudes, social psychologists use the single term “entitativity” to describe both attributes.11
One can imagine entitativity perceptions, if accurate, providing some strategically useful
information. The perceived similarity of group members, for example, might extend to their
propensity for aggressive behavior. In addition, the more cohesive the outgroup, the more likely
its members endorse or support each other’s actions, and the more likely that aggressive
members can be deterred by threats against their uninvolved brethren. Indeed, there is some
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Reviewed by Diane M. Mackie and Eliot R. Smith, "Intergroup Emotions," in APA Handbook of Personality
and Social Psychology, Volume 2: Group Processes, ed. Mario Mikulincer, et al. (Washington, D.C.: American
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evidence from small group research that vicarious retribution is intended to send a “don’t mess
with us” signal to the perpetrator or other potential antagonists.12
However, people often overestimate outgroup entitativity. Cognitive biases promote
oversimplified perceptions of group boundaries and diversity.13 Anger, even if generally helpful
to rational decision-making, tends to distort judgment and behavior in ways that result in
excessive and misdirected punishment.14 For example, feelings of anger aroused following a
serious crime against one’s group heighten stereotypical perceptions of social groups and
prejudice, even when the anger is unrelated to a judgment task at hand (i.e., “incidental anger”).15
In addition, people who have been personally insulted or offended, when they cannot take
revenge against the perpetrator, sometimes lash out in displaced aggression against uninvolved
bystanders.16 Even just learning about serious, unpunished crimes against others arouses a
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Arne Sjöström, Zoe Magraw-Mickelson, and Mario Gollwitzer, "What Makes Displaced Revenge Taste
Sweet: Retributing Displaced Responsibility or Sending a Message to the Original Perpetrator?" European Journal
of Social Psychology 48, no. 4 (June 2018): 490–506.
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For reviews of the large literature supporting this finding, see Craig McGarty, Vincent Y. Yzerbyt, and
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Carey K. Morewedge and Daniel Kahneman, "Associative
Processes in Intuitive Judgment," Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14, no. 10 (2010): 435–440. Even policymakers
often exaggerate the entitativity of foreign actors; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 8.
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Litvak, Jennifer S. Lerner, Larissa Z. Tiedens, and Katherine Shonk, "Fuel in the Fire: How Anger Impacts
Judgment and Decision-Making," in International Handbook of Anger: Constituent and Concomitant Biological,
Psychological, and Social Processes, ed. Michael Potegal, Gerhard Stemmler, and Charles Spielberger (New York:
Springer, 2010).
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Galen V. Bodenhausen, Lori A. Sheppard, and Geoffrey P. Kramer, "Negative Affect and Social Judgment:
The Differential Impact of Anger and Sadness," European Journal of Social Psychology 24, no. 1 (1994): 45–62;
David DeSteno, Nilanjana Dasgupta, Monica Y. Bartlett, and Aida Cajdric, "Prejudice from Thin Air: The Effect of
Emotion on Automatic Intergroup Attitudes," Psychological Science 15, no. 5 (2004): 319–324; Nilanjana
Dasgupta, David DeSteno, Lisa A. Williams, and Matthew Hunsinger, "Fanning the Flames of Prejudice: The
Influence of Specific Incidental Emotions on Implicit Prejudice," Emotion 9, no. 4 (2009): 585–591; Antoine J
Banks, Anger and Racial Politics: The Emotional Foundation of Racial Attitudes in America (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2014); Jonathan Renshon, Jooa Julia Lee, and Dustin Tingley, "Physiological Arousal
and Political Beliefs," Political Psychology 36, no. 5 (October 2015): 569–585.
16
Amy Marcus-Newhall, William C. Pedersen, Mike Carlson, and Norman Miller, "Displaced Aggression Is
Alive and Well: A Meta-Analytic Review," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 78, no. 4 (2000): 670–
689; Norman Miller, William C. Pedersen, Mitchell Earleywine, and Vicki E. Pollock, "A Theoretical Model of
Triggered Displaced Aggression," Personality and Social Psychology Review 7, no. 1 (2003): 75–97; Brad J.
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“prosecutorial mindset” that leads to harsher judgments and greater punitiveness toward
completely unrelated suspects and offenders.17 Vivid and emotionally arousing crime-scene
details providing no incriminating evidence also increase the likelihood of a guilty verdicts.18
These effects have been experimentally demonstrated in mainly interpersonal and
intragroup social contexts. But they likely occur in intergroup contexts as well, because
intergroup emotions parallel ordinary social emotions for those who identify strongly with the
affected group.19 Just as imminent personal threats elicit fear for one’s own safety, imminent
threats to fellow group members elicit genuine fear for the group’s safety, even when one is not
personally endangered. Similarly, offenses against one’s ingroup, regardless of whether one is
personally affected, arouse anger and aggressiveness toward the offending outgroup, which are
attenuated by successful intergroup retribution.20 Beyond identification with the ingroup, factors

Bushman, Angelica M. Bonacci, William C. Pedersen, Eduardo A. Vasquez, and Norman Miller, "Chewing on It
Can Chew You Up: Effects of Rumination on Triggered Displaced Aggression," Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 88 no. 6 (2005): 969–983; Arne Sjöström and Mario Gollwitzer, "Displaced Revenge: Can Revenge
Taste ‘Sweet’ If It Aims at a Different Target?," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 56 (2015): 191–202.
17
Jennifer S. Lerner, Jennifer H. Goldberg, and Philip E. Tetlock, "Sober Second Thought: The Effects of
Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility," Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin 24, no. 6 (1998): 563–574; Julie H. Goldberg, Jennifer S. Lerner, and Philip E. Tetlock, "Rage and Reason:
The Psychology of the Intuitive Prosecutor," European Journal of Social Psychology 29, no. 5–6 (1999): 781–795;
Derek D. Rucker, Mark Polifroni, Philip E. Tetlock, and Amanda L. Scott, "On the Assignment of Punishment: The
Impact of General-Societal Threat and the Moderating Role of Severity," Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin 30, no. 6 (2004): 273–284; Philip E. Tetlock, Penny S. Visser, Ramadhar Singh, Mark Polifroni, Amanda
Scott, Beth Elson, Philip Mazzocco, and Phillip Rescober, "People as Intuitive Prosecutors: The Impact of SocialControl Goals on Attributions of Responsibility," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 43, no. 2 (2007): 195–
209.
18
E.g., James R. P. Ogloff and Neil Vidmar, "The Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors," Law and Human
Behavior 18, no. 5 (1994): 507–526; Kevin S. Douglas, David R. Lyon, and James R. P. Ogloff, "The Impact of
Graphic Photographic Evidence on Mock Jurors' Decisions in a Murder Trial: Probative or Prejudicial?," Law and
Human Behavior 21, no. 5 (1997): 485–501.
19
Eliot R. Smith, Charles R. Seger, and Diane M. Mackie, "Can Emotions Be Truly Group Level? Evidence
Regarding Four Conceptual Criteria," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 93, no. 3 (2007): 431–446.
20
Diane M. Mackie, Thierry Devos, and Eliot R. Smith, "Intergroup Emotions: Explaining Offensive Action
Tendencies in an Intergroup Context," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79, no. 4 (2000): 602–616;
Ernestine H. Gordijn, Vincent Yzerbyt, Daniel Wigboldus, and Muriel Dumont, "Emotional Reactions to Harmful
Intergroup Behavior," European Journal of Social Psychology 36 (2006): 15–30; Angela T. Maitner, Diane M.
Mackie, and Eliot R. Smith, "Evidence for the Regulatory Function of Intergroup Emotion: Emotional
Consequences of Implemented or Impeded Intergroup Action Tendencies," Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology 42, no. 6 (2006): 720–728.
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affecting anger in interpersonal and social contexts—e.g., the degree and intent of harm done and
the victim’s strength relative to that of the offender—typically have analogous effects on
intergroup anger as well.21
There exists little experimental evidence bearing on whether anger at particular outgroup
offenders causes specifically counter-productive aggressiveness toward the offenders’ kin. But
incidental intergroup emotions have “spillover” effects affecting judgments and decisions that
are unrelated to the triggering stimuli, similar to those occurring in intragroup contexts.22 It is
also suggestive that displaced aggression is more likely against bystanders who resemble the
perpetrator of an unpunished offense, in experiments that minimize reputational incentives to
show toughness.23 This effect’s similarity to vicarious retribution suggests common underlying
psychological mechanisms.
The potentially counter-productive nature of vicarious retribution gains further
plausibility from ordinary people’s frequently non-instrumental motives for punishing or
supporting the punishment of actual transgressors. Research on criminal punishment judgments
and cooperation games shows that people often favor punishing offenders for the sake of
“justice” or “just deserts” rather than for security or material gain. Sometimes they even will pay
to punish, whether to assuage the victim’s self-esteem, to satisfy the principle of “an eye for an

21

Mackie, Devos, and Smith, "Intergroup Emotions"; Martijn van Zomeren, Tom Postmes, and Russell Spears,
"Toward an Integrative Social Identity Model of Collective Action: A Quantitative Research Synthesis of Three
Socio-Psychological Perspectives," Psychological Bulletin 134, no. 4 (2008): 504–535; Roger Giner-Sorolla and
Angela T. Maitner, "Angry at the Unjust, Scared of the Powerful: Emotional Responses to Terrorist Threat,"
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 39, no. 8 (2013): 1069–1082.
22
Jennifer S. Lerner, Roxana M. Gonzalez, Deborah A. Small, and Baruch Fischhoff, "Effects of Fear and
Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism," Psychological Science 14, no. 2 (2003): 144–150; Randy J. Rydell, Diane
M. Mackie, Angela T. Maitner, Heather M. Claypool, Melissa J. Ryan, and Eliot R. Smith, "Arousal, Processing,
and Risk Taking: Consequences of Intergroup Anger," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 34, no. 8 (2008):
1141–1152.
23
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eye,” or simply to satisfy a felt need to aggress following a humiliating injury.24 Cost-benefit
calculations are also often curtailed in ordinary people’s thinking about intergroup conflicts over
“sacred values,” including avenging a humiliating injury.25

Implications for foreign policy opinion
Nationalism provides a powerful source of ingroup identification, generating strong
emotional reactions on behalf of one’s nation.26 This makes it at least plausible that external
crimes against one’s nation would sometimes boost support for the use of force against
uninvolved foreign states. Such a hawkish reaction would be consistent with limited-information
pragmatism theories of foreign policy opinion if it is intended to send a deterrent message to
would-be enemies, but not if it is driven by the conflation of foreign actors, a displaced wish for
justice, or some other anger spillover effect.27
Vicarious retribution provides a compelling explanation for non-instrumental public
support for attacking innocent civilian citizens within an offending state. Following Japan’s
defeat in 1945, for example, 13% of Americans wanted to “kill all Japanese” and 23% wished

24

Kevin M. Carlsmith and John M. Darley, "Psychological Aspects of Retributive Justice," Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology 41 (2008): 193–236; Thomas Nadelhoffer, Saeideh Heshmati, Deanna Kaplan, and
Shaun Nichols, "Folk Retributivism and the Communication Confound," Economics and Philosophy 29, no. 2 (July
2013): 235–261.
25
Jeremy Ginges, Scott Atran, Douglas Medin, and Khalil Shikaki, "Sacred Bounds on Rational Resolution of
Violent Political Conflict," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104, no. 18 (2007): 7357-7360;
Jeremy Ginges and Scott Atran, "War as a Moral Imperative (Not Just Practical Politics by Other Means),"
Proceedings of the Royal Society Biological Sciences 278, no. 1720 (2011): 2930–2938; Alan Page Fiske and Tage
Shakti Rai, Virtuous Violence: Hurting and Killing to Create, Sustain, End, and Honor Social Relationships (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
26
Richard K. Herrmann, Pierangelo Isernia, and Paolo Segatti, "Attachment to the Nation and International
Relations: Dimensions of Identity and Their Relationship to War and Peace," Political Psychology 30, no. 5 (2009):
721–754; Jonathan Mercer, "Feeling Like a State: Social Emotion and Identity," International Theory 6, no. 3
(2014): 515–535; Todd H. Hall and Andrew A. G. Ross, "Affective Politics after 9/11," International Organization
69, no.4 (Fall 2015): 1–33; Richard K. Herrmann, "How Attachments to the Nation Shape Beliefs About the World:
A Theory of Motivated Reasoning," International Organization 71, no. S1 (April 2017): S61–S84.
27
Research on the prudential nature of foreign policy includes Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason
Reifler, Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2009).
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that Truman had dropped “many more” atomic bombs “before Japan had a chance to
surrender.”28 More recently, over 40% of U.S. citizens preferred a nuclear attack killing 100,000
Iranian civilians to a near-unconditional Iranian surrender, following an Iranian attack on U.S.
forces in a hypothetical conflict in the Persian Gulf.29
Vicarious retribution might have a weaker impact on support for attacking an uninvolved
state than enemy civilians. States that share a common ethnicity, religion, or ideology frequently
experience internecine rivalry and conflict, and thus might be perceived as less entitative than the
citizens and leaders within a single state.30 In addition, starting a war against a new adversary is
usually more costly than attacking defenseless civilians during an ongoing war, at least—as in
the situations just mentioned—when the enemy state cannot reciprocate. That said, ordinary
citizens are often uninformed about the differences and conflicts among foreign states and actors,
including those sharing religious, ethnic, or ideological traits. Limited foreign affairs knowledge
also often leaves citizens uncertain about the costs of war.31 Thus ordinary citizens might
support vicarious retribution against uninvolved states, at least when the net costs are not
obviously prohibitive.
An international analogue of vicarious retribution differs from other ascriptive theories of
international conflict. Unlike Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” or other theories tracing
international conflict to incompatible ideas, vicarious retribution is generated by mere group

28

John Dower, War Without Mercy (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 54–55.
Scott D. Sagan and Benjamin A. Valentino, "Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran: What Americans Really Think
About Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Noncombatants," International Security 42, no. 1 (Summer 2017): 41–
79.
30
Erik Gartzke and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Identity and Conflict: Ties That Bind and Differences That
Divide," European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 1 (2006): 53–87.
31
Michael Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter, What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).
29
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categorization, regardless of ideational content.32 That categorization can be based on ethnicity,
not just religion or ideology. In addition, recent intergroup injuries play a catalytic role in
vicarious retribution but not in purely ideational theories.
Vicarious retribution should shape public opinion in several ways. Individual differences
in perceptions of the outgroup as entitative should affect aggressiveness toward uninvolved
members of the perpetrator’s broader identity group. In other words, the effect of anger and
revenge on support for force against uninvolved outgroup members should be magnified by the
perceived entitativity of the outgroup (i.e., the perceived entitativity hypothesis).33 Attributions
of blame to the perpetrators’ group due to its perceived entitativity also should sustain anger over
the original offense even after punishing the actual perpetrators (i.e., the anger persistence
hypothesis).
Given some degree of perceived outgroup entitativity, those who feel greater anger and
desires for revenge toward the perpetrator will generally express greater hostility toward the
perpetrator’s outgroup (i.e., the anger–outgroup hostility hypothesis) and greater support for
using military force against uninvolved members of the perpetrator’s group (i.e., the anger–
vicarious retribution hypothesis). Feelings of anger are likely to further bias perceptions of
entitativity, due to heightened categorical thinking and motivated reasoning.34 In theory, that
could have recursive feedback effects, with anger at the perpetrators broadening the attribution of

32

Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1996); Mark L. Haas, Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2005); John M. Owen, The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and
Regime Change, 1510–2010 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Tanisha M. Fazal and Brooke C. Greene,
"A Particular Difference: European Identity and Civilian Targeting,” British Journal of Political Science 45, no. 4
(October 2015): 829-851.
33
Throughout this article we equate revenge and retribution, and lump them together with anger, because we
lack theoretical and empirical reasons to differentiate them here.
34
Lerner and Tiedens, "Portrait of the Angry Decision Maker"; Litvak et al., "Fuel in the Fire.”
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blame to the perpetrators’ kin.35 Thus, hostility toward the outgroup, once aroused, will itself
heighten support for war against its uninvolved members. This would be manifested in an
indirect effect of anger and desires for revenge against the actual perpetrator on war support, via
hostility to the outgroup (i.e., the hostility diffusion hypothesis).
Although not specifically tested here, additional hypotheses spring from the mechanisms
assumed to cause vicarious retribution. For example, individual differences affecting anger
toward the perpetrators, such as exposure to information about offenses (especially the harm
caused and intent) and predispositions to react angrily to provocation, should also affect
vicarious retribution. In addition, an offense against a country will increase its public’s hostility
and aggressiveness toward uninvolved foreign states, leaders, and peoples sharing at least
superficially similar traits with the perpetrator (these might be described as national injury
hypotheses).
Prior evidence for vicarious retribution in U.S. public support for war against Iraq
The hypothesized sources of vicarious retribution were present in spades in post-9/11
America. The attacks’ horrific lethality and destruction of national symbols, al Qaeda’s top
ringleaders having escaped punishment, a national mantra of “never forget,” and extensive media
coverage combined to generate intense and prolonged public outrage. Although this anger ebbed
somewhat over time, on the first anniversary of 9/11 two thirds of the public reported still feeling
“very angry at the people who did this.”36 Even several years later, President Barack Obama

35
Brian M. Quigley and James T. Tedeschi, "Mediating Effects of Blame Attributions on Feelings of Anger,"
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 22, no. 12 (1996): 1280–1288. For possible intergroup evidence of this,
see Eran Halperin and James J. Gross, "Intergroup Anger in Intractable Conflict: Long-Term Sentiments Predict
Anger Responses During the Gaza War," Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 14, no. 4 (2010): 477–488.
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prioritized hunting down bin Laden not just to take “a monstrous leader off the battlefield,” but
also because of the importance of “righting an unspeakable wrong” and “healing a nearly
unbearable wound in America’s heart.”37
Although data is lacking on this point, it seems probable that more U.S. citizens knew
that Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein were Arab and Muslim than that they held radically
opposing religious and political beliefs and despised each other. Public dislike of Saddam
Hussein ever since his 1990 invasion of Kuwait made Iraq a prominent potential lightning rod.
Many citizens were probably uncertain whether the costs of toppling the Iraqi regime
outweighed the potential benefits of stopping its alleged pursuit of WMDs. Such propitious
conditions make this episode a useful initial probe of vicarious retribution’s impact on public
support for war.
Although falling well short of a compelling case, previously available evidence is largely
consistent with a vicarious retribution account. The post-9/11 surge in public belligerence
toward Iraq, followed by a gradual decline, is consistent with the national injury hypothesis. 38
Thermometer scale ratings of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Yassir Arafat, and Saddam Hussein all
declined to a significant degree between 1998 and 2002, while the average ratings for non-Arab
and non-Muslim states and leaders held steady over the same time period.39 Moreover, the
correlations observed between war support and anger over 9/11, as well as that between between
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war support and punitive dispositions, are consistent with the anger–vicarious retribution
hypothesis.40
In addition, after 9/11 over two thirds of the U.S. public agreed that “the Muslim world
considers itself at war with the U.S.” and 25–39% said they had an “unfavorable opinion of
Islam.” Between a seventh and a quarter of the public said their feelings about Arab Americans
had worsened due to the attack, a third said that Arab Americans were relatively sympathetic to
terrorists, and 40% agreed that “the attacks on America represent the true teachings of Islam.” 41
Hate crimes and economic discrimination against American Arabs and Muslims spiked
nationwide after 9/11.42 Although we have not found repeated measures of prejudice toward
Arab Americans before and after 9/11, data from other countries reveal increased prejudice
toward Arabs following major terror attacks.43
Two additional findings are consistent with a vicarious retribution account. First, nearly
a decade after 9/11, Americans expressed higher levels of support for force against an
unidentified Muslim nuclear proliferator than an otherwise-identical Christian one.44 Second,
feelings that the Iraq War would avenge 9/11, measured around the time that the war began,
correlated with prejudice against Muslims measured eight years later.45 Because it is difficult to
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imagine a mechanism by which retributive satisfaction from invading Iraq would have shaped
prejudice against Muslims, it seems more likely that both had been affected by citizens blaming
the “Muslim world” for 9/11.
However, there remain significant gaps and open questions concerning the impact of
vicarious retribution. Thermometer ratings of Muslim Americans did not significantly worsen
after the attacks, and did not predict retrospective support for the Iraq War in 2004. 46 Worsened
views of foreign Muslims might have caused vicarious retribution. But thermometer ratings did
not drop for all Muslim states—those for Iran and Turkey did not worsen as they did for Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan, Yassir Arafat, and Saddam Hussein.47
Moreover, other factors might have been responsible for many of the findings consistent
with the vicarious retribution account. For example, mistaken beliefs that Iraq was involved in
9/11 could have heightened belligerence toward Iraq as well as its correlation with anger at the
terrorists.48 Alternatively, anger at the terrorists could have shaped support for the Iraq War by
making citizens more aggressive and risk acceptant, rather than by arousing vicarious retribution.
Jennifer Lerner and colleagues have shown that anger, including anger over 9/11, tends to
diminish appraisals of future unrelated risks, whereas fear has the opposite effects.49 Indeed,
Huddy and colleagues found that angry citizens expressed greater optimism about the risks of

46
On feelings about Muslim Americans, see Kerem Ozan Kalkan, Geoffrey C. Layman, and Eric M. Uslaner,
"‘Bands of Others?’ Attitudes toward Muslims in Contemporary American Society," Journal of Politics 71, no. 3
(July 2009): 847–862. Feelings about Muslims did worsen in the Netherlands after 9/11, however; Jolanda Van der
Noll, "The Aftermath of 9/11: Tolerance toward Muslims, Islamophobia and Value Orientations," in Islamophobia
in the West: Measuring and Explaining Individual Attitudes, ed. Marc Helbling (New York: Routledge, 2012). On
Islamophobia and Iraq War attitudes in 2004, see Sides and Gross, "Stereotypes of Muslims."
47
Authors’ analysis of data from the 1998 and 2002 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations surveys described in
n. 39.
48
On the prevalence and potential consequences of these beliefs, see Kull, Ramsay, and Lewis,
"Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War" and Althaus and Largio, "When Osama Became Saddam." For
evidence that these misperceptions were less important than might be expected had they represented firm beliefs, see
Liberman and Skitka, "Revenge in US Public Support for War."
49
This study manipulated anger and fear through a reflection exercise but did not measure attitudes about Iraq;
Lerner et al., "Effects of Fear and Anger."

15

war with Iraq.50 Yet another possibility is that confidence in U.S. strength made some citizens
both angrier and more bellicose, resulting in a spurious correlation between these reactions.51
Heightened post-9/11 perceptions of the Iraqi threat or halo effects from the perceived terrorist
threat also might have accounted for some of these longitudinal and cross-sectional findings.
Past research has frequently found associations between threat perceptions, anger, prejudice, and
belligerence, including in post-9/11 public opinion.52
Individual differences in ethnocentrism—i.e., perceptions that one’s ingroup is superior
to all other outgroups—might have been responsible for observed correlations between feelings
about Arabs or Muslims and support for war against states identified as Arab or Muslim.
Ethnocentrism predicted support for war against Iraq in Fall 2002 and was a strong predictor of
feelings about Muslims both before and after 9/11.53 This ethnocentric aggressiveness would be
similar to vicarious retribution if it was activated by angry desires to avenge 9/11 and focused on
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Muslim and Arab states, but it would represent a competing explanation if activated by
insecurity, patriotism, or ethnocentric elite discourse, or if directed against all foreign states.
A final alternative factor to consider is heuristic cue-taking, i.e., citizens echoing
messages received from trusted political elites, a pervasive influence on public opinion.54 In
addition to explaining the public’s substantial levels of pre-9/11 support for toppling Saddam
Hussein, cue taking or differences in news consumption patterns can also account for Democrats’
diminishing enthusiasm for war in Fall 2002.55
However, cue taking has more difficulty explaining the immediate post-9/11 surge in
support for war against Iraq, which occurred months before President Bush first publicly linked
Iraq and al-Qaeda, in his January 29th “Axis of Evil” speech. For the first few months following
9/11, Administration officials had identified al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden as the central
culprits and primary threat to the United States. These messages predominated in media
coverage. From September 2001 through January 2002, the Administration mentioned Osama
bin Laden 50–200 times per month and ABC News did so 150–450 times per month, but neither
mentioned Saddam Hussein more than twenty times per month.56 The Associated Press
mentioned Saddam Hussein about as often in first few months after 9/11 as immediately
before.57 Although a few members of Congress and some experts suggested right after 9/11 that
Saddam Hussein might have been involved or should be overthrown as part of the “war on
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terrorism,” these signals were probably too weak to have caused the immediate uptick in public
support for invading Iraq.
Elite messages nonetheless might have indirectly affected public belligerence toward Iraq
in this period by fanning concerns about the terrorist threat, anger at the terrorists, and antipathy
toward Arabs and Muslims. The news media conveyed and amplified Administration warnings
about the terror threat.58 In addition, Bush’s rhetoric often seemed tailored to stoking outrage
and desire for justice against the “evildoers.”59 The Administration avoided condemning the
Muslim and Arab world, and media criticism of ordinary Muslims actually diminished after 9/11.
That said, ubiquitous media discussions of “Muslim rage,” “Islamic extremism,” and “Arab
terrorists” nevertheless could have promoted perceptions of Muslims and Arabs as monolithic,
dangerous, and evil.60 Some influential voices even openly blamed “Islam” for the 9/11 attacks,
such as the evangelical leader who proclaimed in November 2001 that “Islam has attacked us…I
believe it is a very evil and wicked religion.”61 Thus we cannot rule out, a priori, the possibility
that public cue taking resulted in spurious correlations between anger over 9/11, antipathy
toward Arabs and Muslims, and support for going to war against Iraq.
In sum, there already exists ample evidence consistent with vicarious retribution having
shaped U.S. public support for going to war against Iraq, but the evidence is mostly indirect and
potentially attributable to other factors and processes. Further investigation is clearly needed.
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Data analysis
A panel survey of U.S. adult citizens conducted in 2001-2002 by Knowledge Networks
(now GfK) provides valuable data for this purpose.62 Originally conducted to study how
emotional reactions to 9/11 and feelings about Arabs and Muslims affected political tolerance,
the survey also included an item on going to war against Iraq. It allows testing whether anger
and desires for revenge against the 9/11 terrorists more strongly predicted support for attacking
Iraq among citizens who saw Arabs and Muslims as entitative, as well as whether those who
were relatively angry and vengeful after 9/11 favored war in part because they were
disproportionately hostile toward Arabs and Muslims.
The two-wave panel design and the timing of the waves are also helpful. The first wave
was fielded right after the attacks, during September 14–October 2, 2001 (N=685), and was
nearly four fifths complete before President Bush declared a “war on terrorism” in his signal,
September 20, 2001 address to Congress. Thus the “September 2001” data, which provides our
main measure of anger over 9/11, was relatively independent of the Administration’s discourse
on 9/11. Measuring war support and feelings about Arabs and Muslims in a second
questionnaire, fielded December 28, 2001–January 14, 2002 (N=605, representing an 88%
within-panel cooperation rate), minimizes the possibility that these responses contaminated the
measure of anger collected four months earlier. In addition, because this “January 2002” data
was collected before President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech, at a time when the media was
providing little reporting on Iraq, elite discourse was relatively unlikely to have shaped how
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attitudes about Iraq related to anger over 9/11 and anti-Arab–Muslim feeling, except through
vicarious retribution processes.
Anger at the Terrorists and Arab–Muslim Entitativity
Testing whether the perceived entitativity of the outgroup magnified the effect of anger
and revenge on support for force against uninvolved outgroup members requires measures of
anger or revenge over 9/11, support for war against Iraq, and perceptions of Arab–Muslim
entitativity. For the first of these variables we use September 2001 questions asking how
strongly respondents felt “angry,” “outrage,” “hatred,” and a “desire to fight back” during “the
first few hours after learning the news about the terrorist attacks.” As can be seen in Figure 1,
Americans felt extremely angry in the immediate aftermath of the attacks and continued to report
high levels of anger in response to similar questions posed in January 2002.63 Although the four
items within each wave were presented to respondents within a larger, randomly sequenced
series on varied emotional reactions to the attacks, they loaded strongly on single first-wave and
second-wave dimensions in a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model.64 The limited number
of items and their strong inter-correlations preclude distinguishing between anger, hatred, and
desires for retribution in our data analysis, and anyway we expect these reactions to have very
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similar effects on vicarious retribution.65 We thus measure September 2001 anger at the
perpetrators using the factor scores from the CFA model and label this scale Anger9/01.66
[Figure 1 goes about here]
The war support measure consists of a single January 2002 question on whether “the war
on terrorism should be expanded to Iraq and any other country suspected of harboring or
encouraging terrorists.”67 Mentioning other “suspected” countries complicates interpretation of
affirmative responses as pure support for attacking Iraq. But the 70% responding “agree” or
“strongly agree” was close to the results of other contemporaneous poll questions on military
action against Iraq, whereas questions from that time on military action against Afghanistan or
other states described as aiding or sheltering terrorists were garnering around 90% support.68
More importantly, even if the measure captured support for attacking other states, war on the
mere suspicion of supporting terrorists represents an indiscriminate belligerence akin to vicarious
retribution.
For an indirect measure of perceived Arab–Muslim entitativity, we use January 2002
items asking if, and how much, respondents’ feelings had improved or worsened since
September 11th about “Palestinians,” “people who live in Islamic or Middle Eastern countries,”
and “Arab Americans.”69 Although this measure is also likely to reflect negative feelings like
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anger, fear, and disgust, such feelings would have been worsened mainly by perceived affinities
or similarities with the actual perpetrators. Moreover, there is no obvious reason why feelings
about Arabs and Muslims—apart from the entitativity perceptions underlying them—would have
magnified the effects of angry reactions to 9/11 on war support. On the contrary, to the extent
that emotions are represented in the measure they would tend to obscure rather than simulate the
hypothesized effect of perceived Arab–Muslim entitativity.
Although a majority of the public reported unchanged feelings about the three groups,
28% said they felt “more negative” or “much more negative” about Arab Americans, and 35%–
37% said so about Palestinians and about Islamic or Middle Eastern peoples. Moreover,
respondents who reported worsened views of one group were very likely to do so about the other
two as well. Of those who said they felt worse about “Islamic or Middle Eastern” peoples, for
example, 77% said this about Palestinians and 65% did so about Arab Americans. In contrast,
among those who reported their feelings about Islamic or Middle Eastern peoples had not
worsened, just 17% expressed more negative feelings about Palestinians and only 7% did so
about Arab Americans. All three items load highly on a common factor in the CFA model, and
the factor scores from that model provide our proxy measure of perceived Arab–Muslim
entitativity, which we call Anti-Arab for short.70
To differentiate retributive from protective motivations linked to anger, our analysis
controls for perceived threat and fear of terrorism, as well as their own interactions with AntiArab. We measure the perceived terror threat using January 2002 questions about how
“worried” respondents were about “future terrorist attacks,” “getting infected with anthrax,” and
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“other kinds of bioterrorism.” Questions that ask about “worry” and personal vulnerability
(salient in the anthrax item) tend to elicit more anxiety than do those asking about “concern
over” or the “likelihood of” terror attacks on the nation.71 However, also controlling for a clean
measure of fear, based on January 2002 items asking how “frightened” and “vulnerable” people
felt when thinking about 9/11, should foreground the effects of objective threat perception in
Terror Worry’s estimated effects on war support.72 The perceived terrorist threat—controlling
for fear—ought to have heightened aggressiveness toward Iraq and fear—controlling for threat—
ought to have diminished it. As expected for anger, both effects should have been stronger
among those who regarded the Arab–Muslim world as monolithic.
Figure 2 plots each reaction’s estimated impact on the probability of strong support for
war, among those who said that 9/11 substantially worsened their views of Arab and Muslim
groups (those in the 90th percentile of Anti-Arab), and among those who said their views of
Arabs and Muslims had not worsened at all (those in the 10th percentile). The three graphs are
based on an ordered probit regression of Iraq War simultaneously interacting Anti-Arab with
Anger9/01, Terror Worry, and Fear. As can be seen in the top left panel, Anger9/01 predicts war
support more strongly among those high in Anti-Arab.73 This finding is consistent with anger at
the terrorists being redirected against Iraq by perceptions of a monolithic Arab–Muslim world.
[Figure 2 goes about here]
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The total effect of Anger9/01 on war support, moreover, may have been larger than that
indicated by Figure 2, which holds Anti-Arab constant. If, as we argue below, anger increased
Anti-Arab in addition to being channeled by it, and Anti-Arab itself heightened support for war,
then anger also had an additional indirect effect on war support.
The other panels in Figure 2 show that Anti-Arab also moderated the effects of threat
perceptions and fear. Terror Worry and Fear had no effect on belligerence toward Iraq among
those low in Anti-Arab, i.e., for those who regarded Arabs and Muslims as diverse and
fragmented. In contrast, among those high in Anti-Arab, who presumably perceived a more
monolithic Arab–Muslim world, Terror Worry predicts greater hawkishness toward Iraq, and
Fear predicts the opposite (interactions both significant at p<0.01). These results support the
validity of Anti-Arab as an indirect measure of perceived Arab–Muslim entitativity, and thus
further justify interpreting the Anger9/01 X Anti-Arab interaction as evidence for vicarious
retribution.
Additional evidence for an entitativity effect can be seen in a test of the anger persistence
hypothesis. Even though Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders remained at large in early
2002, the November 2001 U.S. attack on al Qaeda and the Taliban regime would have done
more to satiate anger among those who saw the Arab–Muslim world as diverse and fragmented
than among those who regarded it as more monolithic. Consistent with this, anger levels
declined more between September 2001 and January 2002 among those who scored lower in
Anti-Arab.74
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Anti-Arab’s interactions with anger, fear, and threat do not appear to be spurious
byproducts of ingroup identification, which sometimes correlates with prejudice.75 Ingroup
identification should affect the emotions that people feel in response to their group’s successes
and difficulties, rather than moderating the attitudinal effects of these emotions, the key result
here. Moreover, a January 2002 measure of ingroup pride in the data is only weakly correlated
with Anti-Arab (r=0.13) and does not interact significantly with Anger9/01, Terror Worry, or
Fear when substituted for Anti-Arab in the model used for Figure 2.76
The Anger9/01 X Anti-Arab interaction is also unlikely to reflect mistaken retribution.
The survey did not ask about Iraqi involvement in the terror attacks. But misperceptions of Iraqi
involvement in 9/11 would not have worsened views of all Arabs and Muslims, including Arab
Americans, above and beyond the damage done by the widespread knowledge that 9/11 had been
perpetrated by Arab and Muslim terrorists. And if misperceptions of Iraqi complicity were
inflated by an anger spillover effect, that would be broadly consistent with a vicarious retribution
account.
Anger at the Terrorists and Animosity toward the Arab–Muslim World
We now turn to the question of whether public anger at the 9/11 perpetrators affected
broader perceptions and feelings about Arabs and Muslims, which in turn aggravated support for
war against Iraq. As explained earlier, anger itself is likely to heighten perceptions of
entitativity, resulting in greater blame and hostility toward the perpetrator’s outgroup and
potential feedback effects. Although unable to test these specific processes, we can test the
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overall anger–outgroup hostility hypothesis by exploiting the fact that Anti-Arab measures
worsened feelings about Arabs and Muslims as well as their perceived entitativity. Anti-Arab
correlates more strongly with anger than with fear, and thus appears to measure anger at Arabs
and Muslims much more than fear of them.77 Whereas perceived entitativity should moderate
the effects of Anger9/01 on Iraq War, anger at Arabs and Muslims would have at least partially
mediated it. Even unidimensional variables can function as both mediator and moderator in
some circumstances.78 In this case, moreover, the variable reflects two constructs, one of which
is largely a moderator and the other is largely a mediator.
We begin by examining the relationship between Anger9/01 and Anti-Arab. Figure 3
plots coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from a regression of Anti-Arab on Anger9/01,
controlling for Terror Worry, fear, ingroup pride, political ideology, right-wing authoritarianism
(RWA), gender, race, income, and education.79 Anger9/01 strongly predicts Anti-Arab, with a
10th-to-90th percentile increase in anger felt by otherwise-average citizens corresponding to
feelings worsening about Arabs and Muslims from the median to the 65th percentile. This effect
does not appear to have been due to anger’s common association with perceptions of strength
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and risk. Responses to a January 2002 item on how “strong” people felt regarding “the events of
September 11,” when added to the model as another control variable, neither predicts Anti-Arab
nor alters the estimated effect of Anger9/01.80

[Figure 3 goes about here]

Anti-Arab in turn strongly predicts war support, including the same controls. Figure 4
plots the coefficients from two ordered probit models of Iraq War, a baseline model and another
adding Anti-Arab as a predictor. According the latter model, a 10th-to-90th percentile increase in
Anti-Arab for otherwise average citizens increases the estimated probability of expressing “very
much” support for war from 0.33 to 0.57.

[Figure 4 goes about here]

The data are also consistent with Anti-Arab partially mediating Anger9/01’s effect on
Iraq War. Controlling for Anti-Arab attenuates the estimated effect of Anger9/01, as can be seen
from comparing the Anger9/01 coefficients across the two models. For a more precise indirecteffect estimate, we fit a path model with Iraq War and Anti-Arab assumed to be endogenous to
Anger9/01 and the other control variables, and Iraq War also specified to be endogenous to AntiArab. The estimated indirect effect of Anger9/01 on Iraq War via Anti-Arab is equal to 34% of
Anger9/01’s total effect.81
These results are consistent with anger at the 9/11 perpetrators having increased support
for war against Iraq in part by arousing a broad hostility toward Arabs and Muslims, including
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Arab Americans and others obviously uninvolved in 9/11. Mediation tests do not establish
causal direction among observed variables, but the fact that Anger9/01 was measured four
months before Anti-Arab and Iraq War makes its estimated effect more likely to reflect an
exogenous one. In addition, the control variables included in the models minimize omitted
variable bias to the extent possible with the available data.
Might longstanding prejudices, rather than animosity aroused by the terror attacks,
account for Anti-Arab’s correlations with Anger9/01 and Iraq War? Although we lack a pre-9/11
measure of anti-Arab/Muslim attitudes or any data on ethnocentrism to bring to bear on this
question, there are three reasons for skepticism. First, it seems unlikely that only ethnocentrists
and those who already disliked Arabs and Muslims felt indignant over such a uniquely heinous
and dramatic crime as the 9/11 attacks. Second, if longstanding anti-Arab/Muslim prejudice
accounted for Anti-Arab’s correlation with anger at the terrorists, then Anti-Arab should correlate
just as strongly with anger measured at different points in time. But Anti-Arab correlated more
strongly with the January 2002 measure.82 Third, the questions used to measure Anti-Arab asked
about specifically how feelings had changed due to 9/11. Although it is possible that prejudiced
individuals exaggerated such changes, it seems unlikely that Anti-Arab reflects only prior
prejudice.
The time frame of the data examined here, before the Bush Administration began selling
war against Iraq, should limit the impact on our findings of heuristic cue taking from elite
discourse. But one can probe this possibility further by examining whether more educated
citizens, who are generally more aware of political discourse, expressed feelings and attitudes
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consistent with mainstream or polarized cue taking.83 If elites expressed anger, anti-Arab–
Muslim feeling, and war support, then these also would have been more widely echoed by
politically aware citizens, whereas a divided elite would have generated ideological or partisan
polarization among the politically aware.
If elites did in fact provide one-sided messages of anger at the terrorists, hostility against
Arabs and Muslims, and support for attacking Iraq, these were not reflected in Anger9/01, AntiArab, or Iraq War. As Figure 5 shows, education did not increase any of these key variables in
the population at large. In addition, more educated conservatives were not angrier, more hostile
to Arabs and Muslims, or more belligerent toward Iraq than less educated ones, results that are
problematic for a two-message, elite polarization effect. Conservatives did express greater war
support and more negative feelings about Arabs and Muslims than did liberals, but these gaps
were no greater among more educated citizens. The only result consistent with two-sided
heuristic cue taking is the lower level of anger over 9/11 expressed by educated liberals.
[Figure 5 goes about here]
Admittedly, the sensitivity of these tests is limited by using education as a proxy for
political awareness and by the unusual intensity of post-9/11 media coverage and public
attentiveness, which might have overcome the ordinary difference in political awareness
associated with education. But given the limited administration and media discourse on Iraq
prior to the time when the second wave of the survey was fielded, it seems unlikely that the
evidence for vicarious retribution revealed here resulted from public cue taking.
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Additional evidence of the independence of Anger9/01 from Administration discourse
can be seen from how little this variable changed in surveys completed before and after President
Bush’s address to Congress on September 20th. Bush identified the al Qaeda culprits and
declared a “war on terrorism” for the first time in that widely watched speech, and he employed
rhetoric that was tailor-made to arouse outrage.84 But as can be seen in Figure 6, public anger
was not affected by the speech, and if anything was ebbing gradually over time.85 In theory,
popular anger and desires for revenge already may have been shaped by Bush’s brief promise to
bring the “evildoers” to “justice” on the evening of September 11. But a study analyzing text
messages sent over the course of that day found that public anger shot up dramatically in the
daytime, before Bush gave his first brief remarks that evening.86

[Figure 6 goes about here]
Discussion
The findings presented here lend new support to the idea that shared Arab–Muslim
identities channeled U.S. public outrage at the 9/11 perpetrators toward the Iraq regime. Citizens
who were relatively angry immediately following the terror attacks were relatively belligerent
toward Iraq four months later, especially if they also viewed Arabs and Muslims as monolithic.
This effect was compounded by worsened feelings about Arabs and Muslims in general.
These results control for worry about the terror threat, partisanship, ideology, and
demographics. Although it would have been better to control for a more emotion-neutral
measure of threat perception, controlling for worry about a threat is arguably better for isolating
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the effects of anger than is controlling only for fear or anxiety, as previous studies have done.87
We lack data on perceptions of Iraqi complicity and dangerousness, and the costs and benefits of
war, but none of these factors provide a satisfying explanation of our main findings.
Cleaner measures of perceived Arab–Muslim entitativity, pre-9/11 measures of outgroup
derogation and support for force, and data on beliefs Iraq’s connection to al Qaeda would have
been useful for our analysis. Nevertheless, the weight of evidence suggests that many U.S.
citizens blamed Arabs and Muslims writ-large for 9/11 and favored attacking Iraq as a form of
vicarious retribution.
This helps to fill gaps in our understanding of how stereotyping and anger affected
popular support for war against Iraq. First, it appears that vicarious retribution accounts for at
least some of the previously observed correlations between punitive predispositions, outrage over
the terror attacks, and belligerence toward Iraq.88 Second, it helps explain the prior finding that
many citizens who thought that Iraq had not been involved in 9/11 also said that attacking Iraq
would help satisfy their desire to avenge 9/11.89 In principle, some citizens may have wanted to
crush other “rogue states” besides Afghanistan to demonstrate U.S. toughness and bolster
deterrence of other states contemplating support for anti-U.S. terrorism.90 But the role of
feelings about Arabs and Muslims in war support, and the controls on worry about the terror
threat, suggests that many Americans wanted to punish “the Arab–Muslim world” apart from
seeking to bolster U.S. security.
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Third, although we do not specifically examine ethnocentrism, our findings may help
explain why, as Kinder and Kam put it, “the train of events that began on September 11 served to
activate ethnocentrism among the American public.”91 Individuals who already saw identity
groups in categorical terms would have been particularly likely to blame Arabs and Muslims
writ-large for the actions of a small group of Arab and Muslim terrorists.
Future research should try to provide more precise and discriminating tests of vicarious
international retribution, to probe its underlying psychological mechanisms, and to investigate its
moderators and boundary conditions. Regarding mechanisms, it remains unclear whether angry
citizens support vicarious retribution because they want to send a “don’t mess with me” message
(a strategic motive), because they blame entire groups for the crimes of individual members (an
intergroup analogue of the “prosecutorial mindset” spillover effect), or because it satisfied a felt
need to punish at least a symbolic substitute for an elusive perpetrator.92 Given the potency of
motivated reasoning in political attitudes, perhaps anger and a desire to lash out at symbolic
stand-ins for the elusive Osama bin Laden accounts for some of the suspicions that Americans
expressed about Iraqi complicity in 9/11.93
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Culture and the expected costs of war likely condition whether an injury to the nation
arouses vicarious retribution. Democracies possessing retributive cultures appear to be more
war-prone because their leaders can whip up support for force more easily, by highlighting or
exaggerating a target state’s aggressive or wrongful behavior.94 In addition, given popular
sensitivity to U.S. casualties and the expected security benefits of force, vicarious retribution is
likely to affect support for war most when its costs are expected to be low, ambiguous, or
balanced by potential gains. Vicarious retribution may have been unusually potent after 9/11,
due not only to intense public anger, but also to U.S. military superiority over Iraq and public
uncertainty about the consequences of regime change. This combination of factors may have
created a rare “perfect storm” of vicarious retribution.
That said, it is easy to imagine terrorists once again managing to inflict a horrific attack
on a powerful country, and again proving difficult to locate and punish. In such circumstances,
political leaders might be able to exploit popular vicarious retribution in order to win public
consent for war against uninvolved targets. In the case of post-9/11 United States, public
belligerence toward Iraq diminished the political constraints on President Bush’s path to war. If
vicarious retribution continued to boost this belligerence in fall 2002, it would have added to the
pressure on Congress to approve President Bush’s request, just before mid-term elections, to
authorize war.95 Bush arguably would have been more reluctant to invade Iraq without that
public and Congressional acquiescence.
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Figure 1. U.S. Public Feelings About 9/11, September 2001 and January 2002

Figure 1 Note: Margins of error are <= +/-5%.
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Figure 2. Probability of Strong Support for War Against Iraq

Figure 2 Note: Graphs show the predicted probability of strong agreement with “expanding the war on
terror to Iraq” for citizens at the 10th and 90th percentiles of Anti-Arab. Grey lines represent 95%
confidence intervals, and X-axis labels mark 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of Anger9/01, Terror Worry,
and Fear. Based on Model 1, Online Appendix Table A3.
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Figure 3. Predictors of Worsened Feelings About Arabs and Muslims

Figure 3 Note: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the unstandardized coefficients in a
linear regression model of Anti-Arab; from Model 1, Online Appendix Table A4.
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Figure 4. Predictors of Support for Expanding War on Terror to Iraq

Figure 4 Note: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the unstandardized coefficients from
ordered probit regression models of Iraq War; based on Models 2–3 in Table A3 of the Online
Appendix.
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Figure 5. Effects of Education on Anger, Worsened Feelings About Arabs and Muslims, and Support for
the Iraq War, among Liberals and Conservatives

Figure 5 Note: HS = high school degree, BA = bachelor’s degree. Based on Model 4 of Table A3 and
Models 3 and 4 of Table A4 in the Online Appendix.
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Figure 6. Anger Reported over Time, 14 September–2 October, 2001

Figure 6 Note: Scatterplot of Anger9/01 (with y-axis labels marking the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of
that variable) over survey–completion date, and locally smoothed mean.
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